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     Money is like muck; not good except it be spread.
          —Sir Francis Bacon, 1625
P
opulist ire that arose from the credit crunch is being directed at banks from all corners 
of the globe, triggering a series of new laws and schemas, whose combined effect 
will be to impose on banks greater government control over their economics (more 
regulation on safety and soundness) and greater government interest in their social 
outcomes (inclusive banking). Of course, governments have the right to do this—banks make 
money because governments devise the laws that protect capital and property rights. Further-
more, banks cannot survive without government; it creates the enabling or disabling environ-
ment, and as we have just seen all around the world, government is the ultimate liquidity 
backstop in times of systemic failure. Thus, when economies are suffering, banks cannot 
retreat behind their credit policies, pull up the drawbridge, and wait out the global recession. 
For banks, the question should be, How do we do something meaningful and constructive 
without taking imprudent risks, or being forced by government into taking them?
In the United States, the social mandate for banks is currently formalized in the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act of 19771 (CRA), now well over 30 years old and showing its age. 
CRA encourages banks to use their financial sophistication and their capital-accumulation 
capacity to make the benefits of efficient financial markets more broadly accessible in their 
local communities, in a manner that is consistent with safe and sound operation. Housing 
is a core CRA asset class and an important tool for revitalizing low-income communities: 
housing is what anchors and improves a community, making it more attractive for subse-
quent investments.
The issues targeted by the original CRA—inclusive banking, redeployment of capital 
down-market, and the relationship between private commercial risk and public noncommer-
cial risk—are primarily local or national issues. But today's banking world is global, both in 
capital flows and in multinational institutions, and that should force the field to reinterpret 




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 119At the same time that bankers need to start thinking globally, other nations are acting 
locally. Nations as diverse as China, South Africa, and India are exploring CRA-like mandates 
for their banking industries. Many nations look askance at foreign banks, viewing them as 
exploiters, displacing local entities, heedless of local context or social, cultural, or economic 
requirements. It will not take much for these nations to impose new restrictions on foreign 
investment, foreign-to-domestic lending, or multinational banks and banking. Nor will it 
take them long to create taxes or surcharges that could make such banking unprofitable. 
In response, the global banking community should consider a new commitment to 
community reinvestment, something I call an “inclusive banking charter.” This commitment 
should rest on four working principles:
1. The need for community reinvestment. Banks exist under and are protected by a regu-
latory umbrella that allows them to make profits. Because the regulatory support 
derives its legitimacy from all levels of society, and banks' depository capital comes 
from all levels of society, banks should recycle that capital into the communities 
from whence it came; otherwise capital flows will be used as a tool of disinvestment 
in disfavored neighborhoods.
2. Emerging nations want their own customized forms of inclusive banking and community 
reinvestment.  Although  the  inclusive  banking  goal  is  universal,  applying  to  all 
nations, each nation's response involves custom tailoring. Community reinvestment 
imperatives depend on the relationship between the banking sector—its strength, 
breadth, diversity, and profitability—and the social-investment sector, particularly in 
the context of urbanization and affordable housing. Thoughtlessly replicating the 
current CRA will not do.
3. The current Community Reinvestment Act in the United States is due for a strategic 
refresh. Although the premise of CRA—that banks can and will go down-market on 
a commercially viable basis, but they need government encouragement to do so as 
rapidly as society requires—remains as valid today as it was in 1977, so many other 
things have changed that the original CRA should be updated.
4. Although a globally enforceable Inclusive Banking Charter (IBC) is impossible, critical 
inclusive banking/ community reinvestment principles should be globalized. The CRA is 
limited to activity within the United States. Any other nation's statutory reach will be 
similarly bounded. Yet the world has some experience with transnational financial-
regulatory agreements that transcend borders, such as Basel II.2 As the United States 
remains the world's largest economy, with the most experience in CRA legislation 
and regulation, any other nation's IBC ought to take cues from, and learn from, the 
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Banks and financial institutions exist under and are protected by a regulatory umbrella 
that allows them to profit by taking in money from the public (deposits) at cheap rates, and 
then putting money back out (loans) at higher rates. Banks that use their explicit govern-
ment charter and backing to profit therefore have a duty to redeploy their capital back to 
the community where they got it, on a commercially viable basis, with the government 
absorbing noncommercial risk. 
The three-way relationship among banks, government, and socially responsible inclusive 
banking rests on seven public-policy principles that now have global applicability.
1. Banks do business with the public via an asymmetric power relationship. Banks interact 
with the public in three ways: taking in money (deposits), processing money (check 
cashing and clearance), and putting out money (loans and investments). From the 
perspective of a financial or economic ecosystem, all three are essential; an economy 
does not work until capital is continuously cycling. Yet when the customer is poor, 
the power dynamics tilt in the bank's favor, and a bank may discriminate unwit-
tingly or wittingly. Put crudely, a bank can take money from poor people by allowing 
them to deposit, can make money off poor people by processing their credit cards or 
checks, and yet can exclude poor people from credit, doing nothing to alleviate their 
poverty, and indeed even contributing to it. 
2. What to a bank may look like “careful credit” could be bigotry in disguise. A bank that is 
ultra-cautious with its outlay of capital but thoughtless of its inflow becomes an agent 
of exclusion either intentionally or inadvertently. Were they so inclined, unscrupu-
lous or bigoted banks could perpetuate poverty simply by redlining places, people, or 
ethnic groups in a self-fulfilling prophecy of disinvestment. 
  That sweeping credit bigotry—those infamous maps with entire sections of town 
marked in red (or blue in the United Kingdom), as in “not to be lent to”—was the justi-
fication for the CRA legislation. Credit bigotry is unacceptable, yet credit prudence 
is also desirable, and in today's more complex world, it is difficult to distinguish one 
from the other.
3. The public interest conveys a public authority to ensure inclusionary banking. To operate, 
banks need government's security resources (e.g., charters, deposit insurance).3 When 
these  are  tapped,  usually  in  the  aftermath  of  exuberant,  spendthrift  risk-taking, 
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expansion of government bank regulatory oversight has ever been rolled back. U.S. 
deposit insurance arrived in 1933 (in the same Glass-Steagall statute that limited bank-
ing's other activities). CRA would not follow for four decades. Now, in three short 
years, we have seen an explosion of reluctant-but-inescapable government support:
•  The Troubled Asset Relief Program4 (TARP) and the explicit 2008 backing of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.
•  The Bank of England's 2007 rescue of Northern Rock,5 and its similar massive 
investments into Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyd's, HBOS (the former Halifax 
Bank of Scotland), and others.
•  The  European  Central  Bank's  stress  tests  and  their  consequences,  including 
the slow-motion domino cascade of European Central Bank support for bond 
markets in Greece,6 Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and who knows who’s next? 
  In each case, government has not merely rescued many banks from their past excesses, 
it is now actively replenishing their equity capitalization, with central bankers holding 
macro interest rates at infinitesimal levels while banks then lend the capital at spreads 
much wider than they enjoyed prior to the crisis. 
4. Banks should fulfill their community service obligation through banking-related activities. 
If government could do something better than the banks, it could and would: govern-
ment could simply impose a tax and then redirect the proceeds into the desired 
outcome. But government has learned that it is better to steer and pay than row and 
do. Government does best not by conducting activities that mimic or even compete 
with business, but by establishing priorities and providing resources, creating incen-
tives for banks to do banking business: flow capital down-market in the form of 
lending, investing, and inclusionary access to banking services.
5. The right credit-access boundary is between commercial and noncommercial risks. Banks 
are in the business of taking commercial risks, a key to which is that counterparty 
performance is enforceable through the courts and counterparty damages are collect-
able. Government cannot chide banks for refusing to extend credit unless it relieves 
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Making this distinction is critical because it is not bigotry to withhold credit when 
one cannot rely on government to be an impartial enforcer.
6. The  right  cost-pricing  point  is  at  the  projected  mature-business  scale,  with  subsidies 
covering the pre-expansion costs. Related to the credit risk boundary is the question of 
cost. Left to their own devices, financial institutions will move down-market only by 
moving up the cost curve—charging poorer borrowers higher rates to compensate for 
higher real and perceived risks of default. Once the business has become established, 
however, such lending can return to more normal spreads, restoring affordability. 
Thus, many businesses that are profitable require a non-recoverable startup cost in 
knowledge, information or network infrastructure, or initial activity costs. Private 
for-profit companies invest those costs when the post-scaling profitability justifies 
the return, but that will not always be so with inclusive banking, or at least, not 
quickly enough. Government can eliminate this barrier to growth with targeted or 
time-limited subsidies and tax credits. One example directly relevant to affordable 
housing is the blending of Low Income Housing Tax Credits with CRA equity invest-
ment goals.8
7.  Keep score on the basis of results, and make the scores count, with rewards and penalties 
associated with the scoring. Rating of the banks' performance should be periodic and 
quantitative, with the results and reasoning transparent, and with a public opportu-
nity to provide input and comment. Banks with high scores may gain preferential 
advantages (e.g., in opportunities to do business with the government), while those 
with low scores may be denied access or disadvantaged vis-à-vis growth and consoli-
dation (e.g., bank mergers).9
Inclusive Banking Initiatives Globally
Globalization is pushing a number of changes that create a need for inclusive banking 
initiatives. Start with urbanization, the great demographic force of the twenty-first century. 
As more people move to cities, this puts tremendous pressure on those cities to accommo-
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areas (e.g. São Paulo, Mumbai, Cairo, Istanbul, or Djakarta). Either way, urbanization means 
substantial investment in places, including expensive and complicated infrastructure, and 
that implies long-term capital, most of it debt, all of it reliant on real estate holding its value 
or appreciating. 
In this case, urbanization is bringing together government (provider of law and incen-
tives) and banks (providers of capital and risk assessment). Governments know they cannot 
solve the rapid urbanization/urban renewal problem alone, and that the solution requires 
innovation in housing finance. Meanwhile, banks know they can never solve housing afford-
ability on their own because the simple economics of urban land markets dictate that the 
bottom quartile of below-market earners can never afford true market-quality housing. 
Left to the private market, poor people must choose underconsumption, overpayment, 
or impossible commutes, all of which have their own negative consequences for not just the 
poor, but the middle class as well. For quality urban affordable housing, government must 
come to the fore with evergreen (self-renewing or continuously funded) resources. These 
resources can be cash or non-cash, on budget or off, administered at any of the three levels 
of government—nation (tax policy), state or province (lending and incentives), or locality 
(zoning and real estate taxes)—and they must be skillfully blended with suitable financing 
products and value chains.10
Second to urbanization is the growing recognition that public-private partnerships can 
spur successful urban policy while using the banking sector as a source of capital. When first 
confronted with the challenge of housing affordability, virtually every government chooses 
direct public intervention as its initial option. It may be called public housing (U.S.), social 
housing (U.K. and Europe), or some other name, but governments everywhere love to build 
new units (e.g., Turkey's TOKI11) and rent or sell them to civil servants (e.g., Egypt's Ministry 
of Housing). Moving to public-private partnership for more than just construction involves 
a fundamental shift in government's awareness of the limitations of its natural role and the 
value of partnering.
A third force pointing to a global inclusive banking initiative is the need for a developed 
residential-banking sector. It takes two to tango. Banks must be willing to play, so they 
must be ready to engage with government, experienced with residential finance, committed 
to inclusive banking, and nimble enough to develop customized financial products and 
new community-banking initiatives and divisions. Indeed, at times a CRA emerges from 
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more effective than trying to compete against it.12
Naturally, banks also need customers with enough income to repay a home-purchase or 
home-improvement loan. When the nation as a whole is extremely poor, as in Haiti or Malawi, 
the urban poor earn so little that they can afford only the cheapest housing; thus, when a 
city is flooded with very poor immigrants, what they can afford is too little to be finance-
able formally. As a result, global-south urbanization often involves the rapid proliferation of 
slums and informal settlements, where informal and self-built private investment—shacks and 
slums—has outrun public infrastructure—roads, water, sanitation, and electrical grids. 
Finally, for inclusive banking to emerge there must be a national commitment to over-
coming a heritage of exclusion. America's CRA was born in part from frustration over 
housing as a segregationist holdover: although expunged judicially, discrimination never-
theless persisted spatially. Even vigorous enforcement of Fair Housing laws could not make 
buildings suddenly move or neighborhoods change overnight. During the 1960s, racial segre-
gation in large-city public housing led to education discrimination in places such as Boston, 
Chicago, and New York. South Boston's violent response to school busing led to public 
housing integration. Spatial segregation through forced assignment to public housing in 
Chicago led to a series of civil-rights cases, most notably the Gautreaux decision, mandating 
poverty deconcentration through Section 8 housing subsidy vouchers.13 It is not surprising 
that the four nations most ready for CRA-esque regulation also have national legacies of 
exclusion: South Africa, the United Kingdom, India, and Brazil.
South Africa 
South  Africa  already  has  a  community-reinvestment  initiative,  the  Financial  Sector 
Charter,14 which emerged after the comprehensive failure of the African National Congress's 
first housing initiative, the Gateway program, whose collapse in some ways prefigured Amer-
ica’s subprime fiasco.15 In 2003, political pressure compelled banks to lend in a manner 
that would have directed lending to particular geographies and at highly concessionary 
rates, nearly guaranteeing banks would lose money if they complied. Pulling together as an 
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to a mooted Community Reinvestment Act being taken off the table. Under the resulting 
Financial Sector Charter, banks voluntarily:
•  Negotiated lending and investment goals with quantitative targets;
•  Agreed to report their performance publicly and transparently;
•  Subjected themselves to consequences (prohibited from certain kinds of government 
contracting) for subpar performance or rewards for superior performance (preferred 
access to government contracts). 
The charter ran for five years. Induced to apply their creativity to lower-income house-
holds, banks discovered that they could in fact make money in the market, with a wide array 
of both depository and lending products, as the banks substantially exceeded their cumulative 
capital targets. Their performance under the charter demonstrated its catalytic impact, focusing 
minds on numerous transformational issues, such as basic savings accounts and other inclu-
sionary deposit-taking initiatives, low-income housing finance, financing of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), employment equality, and demographic representation on bank boards. In 
short, the charter experience successfully expanded banks' profitability frontiers down-market 
and turned a segment of the unbanked or underbanked into marketable customers.16
The story has one cautionary element. The charter is unilateral (a pledge by the banks 
without a formal quid pro quo from government), negotiated (developed via an open-ended 
process of engagement), and time-limited (five years). New targets are needed, but in 2008, 
the banking-government re-engagement stalled and is yet (as of January 2011) to be revived, 
although there are hopeful signs. The takeaway lesson is this: a good framework is evergreen 
but periodically adjustable.
United Kingdom
Despite being eminently suitable for a CRA, the United Kingdom has nothing of the 
kind (and the concept is greeted with horror by bankers). Through the 1970s, U.K. building 
societies (akin to U.S. savings and loans) “blue-lined” areas of no lending. During the 1980s, 
the Thatcher government intervened with regeneration schemes, including an inclusionary-
zoning ordinance known as Section 106.17 Under the ordinance, developers seeking approval 
for urban-core redevelopment must ensure a certain percentage of homes are affordable 
(usually they are sold to the local authority and become government-owned council housing). 
To American eyes, Section 106 is clumsy and ineffective: it is a zero-sum game, with no 
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oped urban land, making open-ended land-banking a viable strategy and leaving warehoused 
parcels vacant squares on the urban landscape. 
Logic dictates that quite soon (in legislative terms) the government will turn to banks to 
revitalize downtown areas, as it can unite three post-crunch developments:
•  The new Conservative / Liberal Democratic coalition government is touting a Big 
Society led by private-sector initiatives, with a renewed emphasis on social enterprises 
as the delivery mode.18
•  Banks,  having  been  replenished  with  public  money,  are  now  announcing  major 
profits.19
•  The U.K. recently pioneered the social impact bond, a derivative tied to a nonprofit's 
measurable successful performance on a difficult social problem, such as juvenile 
crime recidivism.20 
Given these developments, look for the government to come to terms with the capital 
challenges and to table some mixture of mandates and incentives that will be later seen as the 
inauguration of a CRA process.
India
Despite Slumdog Millionaire and tourist impressions, India is predominantly rural, with 
only 28 percent of its land urbanized. However, given its enormous size and the speed of its 
urbanization, India's urban housing needs are the world's largest (outstripping even China) 
and most urgent. India needs housing at all levels of affordability: new construction for the 
upper middle class (townhouses and subdivisions), lower-middle-income high-rises to be 
built on greenfield sites like Tata's Nano House,21 and slum upgrading and formalization. 
The country has a long history of societal exclusion: of Indians by the British, and of 
Indians by other Indians. Even today, the Dalits, formerly the untouchables, suffer discrimi-
nation in employment and housing. The exclusion has spatial consequences: India's richest 
urban neighborhoods may be less than a kilometer from the poorest, but they are separated 
by guards and gates, highways and railways. Now the government has launched a massive 
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program, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.22 At the level of formal housing 
with mortgageable title, India is sprouting housing finance companies (HFCs) like mush-
rooms, all regulated by the National Housing Bank. These HFCs will need capital, both to 
establish and expand their enterprises, and also periodically to liquefy their books of business. 
Against this backdrop, India has a formal down-market banking requirement, Priority 
Sector Lending, which directs banks to deliver a portion of their net bank credit into 14 
priority sectors.23 Affordable housing loans qualify, as does microfinance and credit for other 
antipoverty national priorities, such as small-scale industries, small business, and agricul-
ture. The Priority Sector Lending is in some respects similar to CRA and to the Affordable 
Housing Goals of the GSEs.24
India's inclusive banking efforts are different from those in the United States and United 
Kingdom, and more resemble those in South Africa because when inclusive residential lending 
reaches informal housing, new challenges arise. The cornerstones of the U.S. system are the 
mortgageable titles that can be pledged as ready resale collateral and (as is evident in South 
Africa) the implicit guarantee of local judicial enforcement of the lender's right of recovery.25 
Thus the Indian government, if it wants to induce banks to provide meaningful capital into 
slum upgrading and slum formalization, will need to absorb the noncommercial risks. 
India can take a page from the U.S. playbook with its own variations of the Federal 
Housing  Administration  (FHA)  mortgage  insurance.  The  insurance  kicks  in  only  after 
default,26 normal lender remedies, and a collection failure attributable to government. This 
is symbiotic ecosystemic evolution: government co-evolving the policy ecosystem even as 
it imposes a social obligation that compels banks to evolve their economic ecosystem. Such 
collaboration characterizes successful inclusive-banking policy expansion.
Brazil
Through the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced periods of hyperinflation. This experience 
squelched any development of long-term stable interest rates essential to the emergence of 
a proper housing finance system. The result was nonexistent residential finance; the wealthy 
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to 6-10 percent.27 The nation as a whole has a robust banking sector, but it is commercial 
finance, not residential. Against that, under a 2003 law (Resolução 3109 Conselho Mone-
tario Nacional28) banks must earmark 2 percent of their deposits for micro-credit loans, but 
they are unenthusiastic participants and use of the resource is low.
Meanwhile, Caixa Econômica Federal, the government-owned savings bank, has grown 
to be the second largest bank in Brazil and originates roughly 70 percent of all Brazilian 
mortgages. Caixa and other state-influenced organizations can and do offer much lower 
rates for target customer groups, but the result is a crazy-quilt of finance alternatives that 
discourage even formal buyers of quality homes from tapping mortgage finance. Reorienting 
Caixa or converting its lending function into that of secondary market liquidity rather than 
primary origination—in other words, a post-crunch recapitalized GSE mode—would seem an 
essential step to rationalizing residential banking, as would broadening Resolução 3109 along 
the lines of India's evolving Priority Sector Lending.
Other Countries Where Inclusive Banking Initiatives Could Emerge
Other  countries  where  inclusive  banking  initiatives  could  emerge  include  Australia, 
China, and Mexico. Each has its challenges:
•  Australia has no analog to CRA, having only recently adopted a uniform national 
consumer-credit  code  analogous  to  the  U.S.  Home  Mortgage  Disclosure  Act 
(HMDA), supplanting inconsistent state-level codes.
•  China is experiencing both rapid urbanization and runaway development and price 
appreciation in a remarkable alliance between municipalities (which control land) 
and state-owned enterprises (flush with cash). These two groups are jointly plunging 
into high-end urban development fueled by high leverage, low rates, and grossly 
inflated values.
•  Mexico has a long legacy of ejido land (a communitarian approach far short of fee-
simple title), which has slowed its development of effective settlement procedures and 
hence the emergence of mortgages other than those deriving from its government 
mortgage bank SHF (the Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal,29 analogous to U.S.'s Federal 
Housing Administration).
27  The Plane Real is described in Benedict Clements, "The Real Plan, Poverty” (CITY: International Monetary 







FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 129CRA is unlikely to emerge in small countries, where the domestic banking sector is not 
strong enough to innovate voluntarily and the government is more interested in enticing 
international banks to enter than in squeezing them once they do.
Principles for an Inclusive Banking Charter That Can be Applied Globally
The CRA has generated important systemwide benefits, including:
•  Knowledge transfer between banks and community development entities. Activity 
under CRA has taught banks how to lend down-market, how to partner with govern-
ment in public-private ventures that blend economic and social resources, and how 
to slice commercial risk (which banks should take) from noncommercial risk (which 
governments should absorb).
•  Financial product innovation by banks into new business spaces (e.g., lending for 
affordable rental, investment in Low Income Housing Tax Credits or New Markets 
Tax Credits).
•  New business activities and profit centers (e.g., community development banks).
All of these innovative byproducts have permanently and positively influenced afford-
able housing lending and investment. They have also helped government make subsidies 
smarter, not just bigger. 
Engineering a policy that applies these benefits to countries around the world will be diffi-
cult. Transnational policies are rare, but not nonexistent. Protocols such as Basel II or other 
conventions, such as accounting standards, can serve as models going forward. Encouraging 
banks to participate will be difficult too. If a bank dislikes a nation's inclusive banking rules, 
it can choose not to do business there. Companies weighing the potential costs of inclusive 
banking will reject compliance only when they think they can afford to lose that country's 
market. While it may not be an option for any global bank to boycott the United States, 
ignoring a small country may represent only a trivial reshuffling of priorities. However, from 
the small nation's perspective, a global bank's boycott could seriously crimp their access to 
the capital markets. 
Finally, there are the obstacles that exist for any type of inclusive banking: corruption, 
weak enforcement, a large unbanked and underground economy, and nonexistent or unreli-
able earnings and credit histories. Even where inclusive banking is possible and feasible, 
national variations will be great, and they will change over time. Therefore, the system must 
allow for such periodic national adjustment.
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crime have traditionally gone international long before regulation and government.30 Scale 
of criminal activity, however, impels governments to coordinate their response lest jurisdic-
tional arbitrage encourage unethical or illicit activity to migrate to its underpoliced havens. 
This has occurred in global agreements (e.g., Basel II), global conventions (e.g., the United 
Nations’ Global Compact31), and in wider reciprocal agreements eventually knitting into a 
global framework (e.g., corporate income tax treaties, anti-money-laundering statutes in the 
global war on terrorism).
Under transnational structures, broad coalitions of those who see themselves as the forces 
of good either pledge to adhere individually to coordinated policies, or adopt standards of 
business and then invite others to follow either voluntarily or through compliance pressure. 
It is no large leap, for example, to extend the corporate compliance apparatus from purely 
defensive activity (e.g. anti-money-laundering or Foreign Corruption Practices Act32) to affir-
mative activity such as inclusive and community banking. 
Elements of a Transnational Inclusive Banking Charter
A global inclusive banking charter should have global applicability and as much global 
standardization as possible, while allowing for national variation and changing national 
priorities. One policy model to consider is the U.S. Low Income Housing Tax Credit, a 
federal program administered by the states. The national statute specifies incentives, income 
targets, permissible uses, and minimum requirements. Everything else is left to individual 
states, which are instructed to design their own transparent plans to allocate their credits. 
States then score applicants consistent with their plan and report the results. In this instance, 
substitute “Inclusive Banking Charter” for “federal,” and “individual country” for “state,” 
and it becomes evident how an overarching program might be implemented by multiple, 
separate sovereign nations. 
In broad brush strokes, a global inclusive banking charter would have a number of 
elements, such as creating an incentive for outcomes (e.g., capital volume), not efforts or 
processes. It would be self-scored (probably by independent third parties hired by each bank) 
but externally auditable through transparent, publicly available quantitative reports. The 
charter would, like the CRA, encourage innovation but not compel unsound lending and 
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framework, but in sharing the risk of these socially redeemable financial transactions. For 
example, governments could assume noncommercial risk (e.g., judicial failure to enforce 
reclamation of adverse possession after foreclosure). Government would also have the sole 
responsibility for any long-term subsidy necessary for affordability.
In time, the market that would grow up from these new policies would evolve on the basis 
of market size, population (including at low-income levels), and the commercial-bankability 
possibilities. Banks might start by making loans at cost, or marginally below market, and with 
credit policies marginally more liberal than normal. Over time, the below-market rates and 
above-market credit policies would blend into true market lending, not because the capital 
became more expensive, but because the market matured. If markets follow their normal 
course, such as we saw in the evolution of the affordable housing economy in the United 
States, banks would begin to make a decent profit on this activity on a risk-adjusted market-
return basis. And in the long run, it would not depend on subsidy to make lending possible.
Another policy to consider in formulating the charter would be to look to how CRA has, 
and has not, worked over the past 30 years. On the basis of that experience, I recommend 
the following:
•  More institutions encompassed. All major financial institutions, not just deposit-taking 
banks, should be subject to the charter. Any major entity that has explicit or systemi-
cally implicit government backing—that is, insurance companies, investment banks, 
and commercial banks, to name the obvious—should have a community reinvest-
ment obligation.
•  More capital forms recognized. Rather than a bright-line division into debt and equity, 
think in terms of spending and risks accepted. Myriad capital forms—guarantees, 
swaps, securitized strips, credit enhancement, indeed every fragmented capital slice 
that has a commercial purpose—should be eligible for inclusion as a qualifying capital 
deployment. 
•  More alignment with economic distress, less with geography as its proxy. If the data tech-
nology will permit, instead of a geographically bounded definition of a target area 
(the service area in the parlance of the CRA), develop one aimed at socioeconomic 
need. (India is GPS mapping every slum in the country,33 over 6,500 of them, and is 
planning on conducting detailed on-the-ground censuses.) 
•  More innovation credited. In addition to broadening the eligibility of spends and risks 
for charter credit, give bonus points for innovation. 
•  Eliminate the churning incentive. Currently, CRA gives credit to new investments and 
not for “holding” an existing investment. This creates an incentive to constantly make 
33  "For accurate data, government plans to map slums," The Times of India, February 15, 2010, accessible at http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/For-accurate-data-govt-plans-to-map-slums/articleshow/5574451.cms. 
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charter should treat capital deployed in an existing investment as being as valuable as 
a new spend.
•  Uniform examination. For curious historical reasons, the CRA is regulated by four 
independent entities (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Reserve 
System), a structure that invites inconsistency. There should be one examining body 
for the inclusive banking charter, and by implication it needs to be supra-national.
Why Banks Themselves Should Take the Lead
If banks do not extend their thinking to help government, government will demand that 
help eventually. When it does, government will be acting with only the best of motives—
healthy capital flows and healthy communities—but it can do harm nevertheless out of igno-
rance or unsophistication. Banking is complex, jargon-intensive, and fast-moving. To the 
less informed, good credit discipline can look like bigotry or redlining. Refusal to assume 
noncommercial risk (e.g., of government counterparty performance) can be interpreted as 
blackballing. In its zealous efforts to stamp out prejudice, government could do much more 
harm than good. Banks should and can forthrightly acknowledge a social responsibility to 
bank expansively (reaching out to those as yet underbanked) but sensibly, and to work with 
government to craft programs that make government responsible for noncommercial risk, 
and for permanent subsidy. 
For the banks, the devil one designs for oneself is far better than the one a frustrated 
government can impose. For banks’ own survival and self-preservation, they must help 
evolve the regulatory ecosystem. Global inclusive banking is part and parcel of what banking 
is supposed to do.
David A. Smith is founder and Chairman of Recap Real Estate Advisors (www.recapadvisors.com), 
a Boston-based national company providing financial services for residential real estate, with particular 
expertise in affordable housing. He is also founder and President of the Affordable Housing Institute 
(www.affordablehousinginstitute.org), a nonprofit consultancy that works around the world to create 
and implement affordable housing financial products and programs that enable mission-oriented afford-
able housing entities to scale capital. Recipient of a $1 million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, AHI works to turn global slums into financial assets through pro-poor slum upgrading and 
home improvement finance. AHI's work has taken Smith to Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Ireland, 
Kenya, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
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